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A. Finality of Administrative Action
In Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus,I the Fourth Circuit determined
whether an informal administrative action 2 was "final ' 3 within the mean-
ing of the Administrative Procedure Act' for purposes of judicial review.
564 F.2d 1119 (4th Cir. 1977).
2 Section 551(13) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1976)
defines an "agency action" to include "the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." An "order" is "the whole
or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in
form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making. . . ." Id. § 551(6). A "rule" is "the
whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. . . ." Id. § 551(4). Agency
proceedings that formulate orders and rules are characterized as formal adjudication and
informal rule making, respectively. Formal adjudication requires a quasi-judicial hearing
before an administrative law judge. Witnesses appear for both sides, and a record is compiled.
Id. §§ 556(6), 3105, 5362, 7521. For informal rule making, the APA requires only that the
agency publish the proposed rule, including a description of the subjects and issues involved,
in the Federal Register. The agency also must give "interested persons" an opportunity to
participate and must publish the final regulations. Id. § 553(b), (c). The potential for overlap
between rules and orders is more than simply a problem of semantics because the APA does
not make its minimum procedures for rule making exclusive. Pedersen, Formal Records and
Informal Rulemaking, 85 YAmE L.J. 38, 39-41 (1976). Furthermore, many agency decisions can
be characterized as either rules or orders. Id. at 41. See also K. DAvis, ADmNIsTRATivE LAw
TRAnIS § 4.13 at 206 (Supp. 1970).
Informal rule making has several advantages. Not only does it simplify the agency deci-
sion making process and effectuate a speedier, less expensive resolution of legal and policy
questions, it also allows for broad public participation in the administrative process and
enables agencies to draw upon the expertise of outside parties. Finally, informal rule making
permits the formulation of prospective standards and guidelines. Brotman, Ex Parte Contacts
in Informal Rulemaking: Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC and Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 65 CAL. L. REv. 1315, 1322-23 (1977).
3 The APA provides for judicial review of any "final agency action ... " 5 U.S.C. § 704
(1976). While there is no clear standard for what constitutes a "final agency action," the
Supreme Court has indicated that agency actions which are not "final," but which represent
an intermediate stage in a series of events which may culminate in a more formal proceeding,
are not final orders and are not subject to 5 U.S.C. § 554 governing adjudications. See ITT
v. Local, 134, 419 U.S. 428, 442-44 (1975).
A 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344, 5371, 7521 (1976). 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976)
provides:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is sub-
ject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly
required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purpose of this
section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a
declaratory order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the agency otherwise
requires by rule and provides that the action is meanwhile inoperative, for an
appeal to superior agency authority.
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Specifically, the court examined the district court's grant of injunctive
relief3 to Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. (Fort Sumter) barring the National Park
Service (Park Service) from awarding a concession contract to Gray Line
Water Tours, Inc. (Gray Line). The injunction was granted to preserve the
plaintiff's statutory right of preference.' Fort Sumter Tours also furnished
the Fourth Circuit with its first opportunity to review an application of the
trial court standard for interlocutory injunctive relief formulated in
Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co.7 The Fourth Cir-
The National Park Service, a subsidiary of the Department of the Interior, is bound by the
provisions of the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); 16 U.S.C. § 462 (1976).
Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 914, 921 (D.S.C. 1977).
The statutory right of preference is delineated in 16 U.S.C. § 20(d) (1976):
The Secretary [of the Interior] shall encourage continuity of operation and facili-
ties and services by giving preference in the renewal of contracts or permits and in
the negotiation of new contracts or permits to the concessioners who have performed
their obligations under prior contracts or permits to the satisfaction of the Secre-
tary. To this end, the Secretary, at any time in his discretion, may extend or renew
a contract or permit, or grant a new contract or permit to the same concessioner
upon the termination or surrender before expiration of a prior contract or permit.
Before doing so, however, and before granting extensions, renewals or new contracts
... , the Secretary shall give reasonable public notice of his intention so to do and
shall consider and evaluate all proposals received as a result thereof.
The statutory right of preference provides that a satisfactory concessioner has a right to
preferential treatment in contract renewal proceedings. The purpose of this provision is to
ensure the continuity of concessioner services in the national parks. Fort Sumter Tours, Inc.
v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 914, 919 (D.S.C. 1977); 16 U.S.C. § 20(d) (1976). For the legislative
history of § 20(d), see Pub. L. 89-249 § 5, Oct. 9, 1965, 78 Stat. 970. See also National Parks
and Conservation Assoc. v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Southwestern Petro-
leum Corp. v. Udall, 361 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1966).
A similar concept of preferential contract renewal rights appears in the field of public
broadcasting. See Note, Petition to Deny Broadcast License Renewals, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 375
(1977). See generally Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1214-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), clarified on rehearing, 463 F.2d 822, 823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972) where the court
rejected the Commission's finding that "substantial service" by the holder of a broadcasting
license warranted virtually automatic renewal. Rather, the court required a single full com-
parative hearing in which all applicants would have an opportunity to develop evidence and
have their applications evaluated on all relevant criteria. 447 F.2d at 1214-15. Upon rehearing,
the court held that where the Commission preferred to develop criteria for license renewals
over time by means of an evolving case-by-case analysis, the court would not direct it to
devise one established formulation. 463 F.2d at 823-24; cf. WHDH Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1967),
aff'd sub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (FCC provisions for preferential consideration in licensing
renewal proceedings are inapplicable where the renewal applicant, by virtue of his peculiar
circumstances or past performance, is to be treated as a new applicant); Wabash Valley
Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677, 678-81 (1963) (upholding the licensee's preferential right
to renewal, despite more appealing features in a competitive bid); Hearst Radio, Inc., 15
F.C.C. 1149, 1175 (1951) (a licensee's past performance is to be given considerable weight in
renewal proceedings).
7 550 F.2d 188, 196 (4th Cir. 1977). In Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Congoleum Corp.,
554 F.2d 1283, 1285 (4th Cir. 1977), the Fourth Circuit instructed the district court to apply
the Blackwelder test on remand, but Fort Sumter Tours is the first case reviewing an applica-
tion of the test.
There is considerable disagreement among the circuits and among courts within the
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cuit held that the Blackwelder balance-of-hardship test had been applied
properly and that the district court correctly granted Fort Sumter injunc-
tive relief.8
Fort Sumter provided boat transportation to and from the Fort Sumter
National Monument, an island in the Charleston Harbor? All parties to
the controversy stipulated that Fort Sumter's performance of its ten-year
contract with the Park Service had been satisfactory and thus, Fort Sum-
ter was statutorily entitled to preferential rights in negotiation of a new
contract.'" Several months before the contract expired, the Park Service
informed Fort Sumter of its intention to negotiate a new contract, provided
Fort Sumter agreed to modify its proposals to match certain provisions
included in a competing bid submitted by Gray Line." Fort Sumter was
also advised that a refusal to accept the additional provisions would be
construed as an automatic waiver of its preferential negotiating rights. 2
Furthermore, a refusal by Fort Sumter would cause the Park Service to
commence negotiations with Gray Line.' Fort Sumter informed the Park
Service that it agreed to the conditional offer to negotiate and would match
the additional terms, but only if it were unsuccessful in its suit alleging
that the Park Service's offer and accompanying ultimatum constituted an
arbitrary and capricious denial of statutory rights." The Park Service con-
strued Fort Sumter's response as a rejection of the additional terms and a
waiver of preferential rights. The Park Service subsequently initiated ne-
circuits regarding the criteria for granting preliminary injunctions. See Leubdorf, The Stan-
dard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HAxv. L. Rav. 525, 525-26 (1978). Blackwelder is a four-
fold test, evaluating the petitioner's probable right to relief, the likelihood of irreparable
injury if interim relief were denied, the potential harm to other parties as a consequence of
the injunction being granted, and the impact of injunctive relief upon the public interest.
Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mgf. Co., 550 F.2d at 193. Special emphasis is placed
upon the plaintiff's likelihood of injury if relief is denied as contrasted with any harm to the
defendant if the relief is granted. Id. at 196. Compare Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 239
(5th Cir. 1975) (four-fold test for issuance of preliminary injunctions: substantial likelihood
that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable
harm if relief is denied; potential harm to plaintiff outweighs potential harm to defendant;
granting relief will not injure the public interest) and Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241
(6th Cir. 1974) (four-fold test: substantial question at issue; plaintiff demonstrates a possibil-
ity of success on the merits; balancing potential injuries to the parties requires relief be
granted; public interest would be served by the relief) with Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1973) (two-fold test: probability of plain-
tiff's success on the merits; and a showing that irreparable harm will result if relief is denied).
564 F.2d at 1125.
Id. at 1121.
"0 Id.
" Id. at 1122.
12 Id. at 1121-22; 16 U.S.C. § 20(d) (1976). The Secretary argued that Fort Sumter's
preference right was a right of first refusal. Brief for Appellee at 6-7. Fort Sumter argued that
it had not been afforded its right of first refusal. The Secretary had not submitted to it a
proposal package which any other company, including Gray Line, was ready, willing, and able
to perform. Id. The scope of plaintiff's statutory right of preference was not addressed by the
Fourth Circuit, which declined to decide the merits of the litigation. 564 F.2d at 1125.
13 Id. at 1122.
" Id.
1979]
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gotiations with Gray Line.'5
Fort Sumter brought an action challenging the Park Service's negotia-
tions with Gray Line, and the district court held that the matter was ripe
for review.'" The court also held that the decision to negotiate with Gray
Line as a result of Fort Sumter's conditional acceptance was a violation of
the concessioner's statutory right of preference. The district court therefore
issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Park Service from contract-
ing with Gray Line to provide boat transportation. 17 Gray Line sought a
stay pending appeal of the injunction.'8 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
confronted initially the frequently litigated issues of ripeness and standing
for judicial review.'"
In its appeal, Gray Line argued that the district court had failed to
recognize that an agency decision is not reviewable until actually made."0
According to Gray Line, the Park Service's decision to discontinue contract
talks with Fort Sumter and negotiate exclusively with Gray Line was not
a "final agency action" within the Administrative Procedure Act and
hence not reviewable.2' Gray Line also contended that the issuance of the
injunction effectively discontinued the administrative process, which had
not yet proceeded to any conclusion.2
In determining whether the controversy was ripe for judicial review, the
Fourth Circuit was first required to decide whether the plaintiff should be
compelled to exhaust any additional administrative remedies.? The court
emphasized that while most agency decisions are not ripe for judicial re-
Is Id.
18 Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 914, 919-21 (D.S.C. 1977).
,1 Id. at 920-21. The initial temporary restraining order was later extended. The district
court then issued a preliminary injunction. Id. at 915.
, 564 F.2d at 1121.
Principles governing direct judicial review of informal agency decisions are still in the
formative stages. Vickery, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action: A Case Study of
Shareholder Proposal No-Action Letters, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 307, 355 (1976). The traditional
requirements that a controversy be ripe for review, that the parties exhaust all administrative
remedies, and that challengers of the agency action be proximately affected in order to
establish standing for judicial review, have been relaxed in recent years. The requirement of
sufficiently probable injury as a prerequisite to judicial review requires subjective judgment
on the part of judges and prospective litigants alike. See Fuchs, Prerequisites to Judicial
Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817, 938-84 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Fuchs]. See generally K. DAVIS, ADmINISTRATiVE LAw OF THE SEVENTIES, 469-528 (1976),
(Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs]; Note, Administrative Law-Ripeness-Agency
Head's Informal Opinion Letters Held Unripe for Review When No Substantial Hardship
Placed on Parties, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1249, 1250-55 (1976).
11 564 F.2d at 1123-24. The federal law of exhaustion is substantially unclear. The time-
worn adage that the parties must exhaust all administrative remedies before going into court
is false almost as often as it is true. Courts are usually allowed considerable discretion in
determining whether or not to require exhaustion, and decisions frequently are influenced by
considerations other than exhaustion. Even the basic question of whether exhaustion is gov-
erned by rule or discretion remains unanswered. DAVIS, supra note 19, at 446, 449-50.
21 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976); notes 3-4, supra.




view until a formal administrative order is issued against a person or class
of persons, a formal order is not an absolute prerequisite to review.24 The
Fourth Circuit, applying the criterion established by the Supreme Court
in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,25 noted that in analyzing whether the
parties should exhaust additional remedies, a court must balance consider-
ations of finality against the hardship to the parties caused by withholding
judicial consideration and the suitability of issues for judicial decision. 6
The exhaustion doctine is intended to avoid interruption of the admin-
istrative proceedings before the agency has had an opportunity to utilize
its expertise in a given areaY The doctrine enables the agency to complete
its investigation of the controversy prior to any final administrative deci-
sion and to uncover and correct its own mistakes, thereby conserving judi-
cial time. 8 The exhaustion requirement is also intended to avoid deliberate
abuse of the administrative process by parties seeking to bypass agency
proceedings. 9 The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the ex-
haustion doctrine is not inflexible. In deciding whether the doctrine bars
judicial review of a controversy at a given point in time, the court must
21 Id.; see note 2 supra. See generally Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-
49 (1967); Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410, 416-17 (1st Cir. 1973); see also Fuchs, supra
note 19, at 859-91; Griffin, The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act: Its
History, Provisions, and Interpretation, 61 GEO. L.J. 575, 608 (1973).
21 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). The plaintiff, a drug
manufacturer, challenged a Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation which man-
dated that the generic name of a drug appear on the label in addition to the brand name. Id.
at 148-49. The lawsuit commenced before the regulation actually had been enforced. The FDA
argued that the regulation would not be ripe for challenge until such time as it was enforced
against a drug company for criminal misbranding. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that because the manufacturer's complaint presented a question of law that did not turn on
the facts of the particular case, the issues were fit for review. Id. In addition, if the regulations
were enforced at a later date, the manufacturer would be obligated to invest in relabelling.
Furthermore, a criminal proceeding might tarnish the company's public image. Id. at 152-
53.
Similarly, an agency action merely announcing a policy decision not yet in effect also
may be ripe for judicial review. Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66-69 (1963)
(informal sanctions which included threats of legal sanctions held ripe for review); Flem-
ming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153, 167-68 (1958) (FDA order revoking certification
of certain food coloring ripe for review despite legislative stay postponing enactment of order
for three years); Continental Air Lines v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 123-24 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (orders
of CAB announcing seat configuration policy were ripe for review where there was every
indication that Board considered its policy final; where policy had since been applied in two
instances; and where hardship to parties of withholding consideration would be substantial).
28 564 F.2d at 1123.
2 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); See generally Fuchs,
supra note 19, at 859-91; see also DAvis, supra note 19, at 446, 449-50.
'-'See note 25 supra.
21 See DAvis, supra note 19, at 446, 449-50. See also Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362,
368-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming district court dismissal of a class action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies).
'- Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41, 148-49 (1967). See generally note
25 supra.
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look to whether the agency's decision making process has reached a point
where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication,
and whether binding legal consequences have emerged from the agency
action .
3
In Fort Sumter Tours, the Fourth Circuit held that legal consequences
had emerged from the Park Service decision to discontinue negotiations
with the plaintiff and commence negotiations with Gray Line and that the
issues were fit for judicial review .3 Although the Park Service decision was
an informal administrative action, its impact upon Fort Sumter and upon
Fort Sumter's statutory right of preference was a final agency decision.3
The district court ruling, affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, expressed doubt
concerning whether there were any additional administrative alternatives
which Fort Sumter could pursue.3 Even if alternatives were available, the
court reasoned that they were likely to be futile because the Park Service
was unlikely to reverse itself and resume negotiations with the plaintiff.3
The district court concluded that to deny Fort Sumter injunctive relief and
to postpone any judicial intervention until a contract was executed be-
tween the Park Service and Gray Line effectively would deny plaintiff its
statutory preference right and such denial could conceivably cause irrepar-
able harm to plaintiffs business by forcing plaintiff to interrupt operations
31 564 F.2d at 1123; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). 5 U.S.C.
§ 703 (1976) provides for review in any court of competent jurisdiction where there is an
"inadequacy" in the statutorily prescribed method of review. Arguably, "inadequacy" for
purposes of review may exist even when a factual issue remains unresolved, yet remand to
an agency is inappropriate. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). Indeed,
§ 704 states that "final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in court" is
"subject to judicial review." See note 4 supra. The APA's judicial review provisions, incorpo-
rated in 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976), are to be broadly construed to provide judicial review of
administrative decisions whenever a court deems judicial review appropriate. See Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41, 148-49 (1967); Tempo Trucking & Transfer
Corp. v. Dickson, 405 F. Supp. 506, 512-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. One 1957 Buick
Roadmaster, 167 F. Supp. 597, 599 (E.D. Mich. 1958). While an agency's interpretation of
its own regulations is to be afforded substantial deference, that does not mean unreviewable
discretion. Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1975). The exception from
judicial review of actions committed to an agency's discretion is a narrow one. 5 U.S.C. §
701 (1976). Only in those rare situations where statutes are drawn so broadly that in a given
case no law applies is the exception applicable. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1970). See generally Associated Elec. Co-op. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); see also Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 999-
1000 (1969); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of 'Committed to Agency
Discretion,' 82 HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968).
1 564 F.2d at 1123.
1 Id.; see note 3 supra.
3 Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 914, 919 (D.S.C. 1977); 564 F.2d at
1123.
3 440 F. Supp. at 919. The court will not require a party to exhaust additional adminis-
trative remedies when such a course would be to no avail. Id., citing NLRB v. Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers Local 22, 391 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1968); Marsh v.
County School Bd., 305 F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1962); Quarles v. Philip Morris, 271 F. Supp.
842, 847 (E.D. Va. 1967).
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indefinitely." The Fourth Circuit agreed that the agency's decision to dis-
continue negotiations with Gray Line was a "final agency action" insofar
as Fort Sumter was concerned and that the controversy was ripe for re-
view. 7
The Fourth Circuit adopted the Abbott Laboratories "functional ap-
proach" to the ripeness question. Such an approach disregards the form
of the agency action, which was admittedly an informal agency decision,
and focuses instead on its essence and impact upon the plaintiff.3 The Fort
Sumter court emphasized that the issues before the district court were
strictly legal in nature. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit had to determine
the scope of Fort Sumter's statutory entitlement and whether the entitle-
ment had been improperly denied. Such issues are peculiarly within the
court's competence and not restricted to an agency's expertise. 9 Further-
more, the plaintiff had established standing for judicial review based upon
the hardship it would suffer if relief were denied." Fort Sumter would lose
its preferential rights under the statute and sustain a severe financial loss,
regardless of the final outcome of the litigation. 1 Moreover, the statute was
clearly intended to insure continuity of concessioner services in the na-
tional parks. 2 The injury Fort Sumter would experience if relief were de-
nied was arguably the type of injury which the statute was intended to
prevent. 3 Thus, the issues presented satisfied the two criteria for ripeness
set forth in Abbott Laboratories: suitability for judicial decision and poten-
tial hardship to the plaintiff from denial of judicial review.44
Having decided that the plaintiff did not have to exhaust additional
remedies and that the Park Service decision to discontinue contract nego-
tiations with Fort Sumter was ripe for judicial review, the Fourth Circuit
considered whether the district court correctly applied the Blackwelder
balance-of-hardship test for injunctive relief.45 The Blackwelder test pro-
vides that a preliminary injunction will be issued when the plaintiff is able
21 Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 440 F. Supp. 914, 919-20 (D.S.C. 1977).
564 F.2d at 1123; see note 3 supra.
Id.; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
564 F.2d at 1123. But see American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 496 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir.
1974) (exhaustion of remedies requirement is not inapplicable merely because controversy
contains only questions of law).
11 564 F.2d at 1124.
41 Id.
42 See note 6 supra.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) reads in part: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review." Cf. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organization
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (trend is toward enlargement of class of individuals who
may protest administrative actions pursuant to a given statute); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc..
v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 868-69, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (bidder denied government contract as
result of alleged illegal activity on part of Federal Aviation Administration had standing
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) to bring suit to determine validity of agency action).
" 564 F.2d at 1123; see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
I 564 F.2d at 1124; Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193 (4th
Cir. 1977).
1979] FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
390 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
to demonstrte that. it has a probable right or interest which may be de-
feated if relief is not granted." Considerable weight is given to the plain-
tiffs need for protection as contrasted with the probable injury to the
defendant if relief is grantedY.7 The plaintiff need not demonstrate a likeli-
hood of success on the merits as under other tests." The Blackwelder test
also requires the court to evaluate whether the public 'interest will be
advanced by a granting of injunctive relief."
In affirming the district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction
pursuant to the Blackwelder test, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that Fort
Sumter faced a possible loss of its entire operation if relief were denied.
At the very least, Fort Sumter would be forced to suffer protracted admin-
istrative procedures and perhaps be forced to sell part of its assets.- The
only harm to Gray Line stemming from the injunction would be a tempo-
rary suspension of any plans to expand its operations pending the outcome
of the suit." The court also pointed out that public service would not be
interrupted as a result of the injunction because Fort Sumter agreed to
continue its operations until the litigation was concluded."
While the Fourth Circuit did not decide the merits of -the controversy,
the court indicated that the Park Service failed to observe Fort Sumter's
statutory preference. The court noted that Gray Line's bid did not respond
to the bid specifications of the Park Service. The bid also failed to finalize
provisions for a docksite within the city of Charleston. 3 Furthermore, the
court severely questioned whether Fort Sumter had been afforded its statu-
tory preference when the plaintiff was informed that it would be compelled
48 Id., citing West Virginia Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232, 235 (4th
Cir. 1971); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F.2d 42, 45 (4th Cir. 1932).
11 Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977).
11 Id. See generally note 7 supra.
,1 550 F.2d at 197; 564 F.2d at 1125. The district court also applied the Blackwelder test,
but stated that if the test were inapplicable, Fort Sumter was nonetheless entitled to injunc-
tive relief based upon its strong showing that it was likely to prevail on the merits, the
likelihood of irreparable harm if relief were denied, the likelihood that the defendant would
not be injured by the injunction, and the fact that there was no potential harm to the public
interest. 440 F. Supp. at 920-21. The only significant difference between the district court's
analysis and the Blackwelder test in Fort Sumter Tours is that the district court relied upon
a "likelihood of success" rationale specifically rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Blackwelder.
Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d at 195-96; 440 F. Supp. at 920-21.
5' 564 F.2d at 1124-25.
11 Id. at 1124. See also 440 F. Supp. at 921.
52 564 F.2d at 1125; cf. Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 197
(4th Cir. 1977) (federal statute prohibiting alleged acts of defendant and providing plaintiff
with grounds for complaint, aligned plaintiff, if only provisionally, on side of public interest
and weighed in favor of granting injunctive relief); West Virginia Conservancy v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232, 236 (4th Cir. 1971) (public interest in preservation of forests provided
additional authority to justify district court's granting of injunctive relief ordering defendant
to halt all mining and timber-cutting in Monongahela National Forest prior to submission of
environmental impact statement); Vanadium Corp. v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686,
696 (D. Del. 1962) (public interest in guarding against violations of antitrust statutes justified
granting of injunctive relief).
11 564 F.2d at 1125.
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to match provisions in the Gray Line offer but denied an opportunity to
see the bid and to protest its deficiencies."
The Fourth Circuit decision in Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus es-
tablishes that to determine whether an administrative action is ripe for
review, a court must balance considerations of finality against the likeli-
hood of injury to the plaintiff if interim relief is denied. 5 Judicial review
usually is unavailable to litigants until they have exhausted all adminis-
trative procedures, 5 and agency expertise typically is afforded considera-
ble deference in statutory construction. Where the plaintiff has demon-
strated a likelihood of serious harm, however, the Blackwelder test will
operate to allow injunctive relief to preserve the status quo, pending a
judicial decision on the merits."
B. Publication Requirements for Federal
Agency Regulations
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires administrative
agencies to publish substantive rules of general applicability, statements
of general policy, and interpretations of general applicability formulated
and adopted by the agency.1 These rules, statements and interpretations
Id. See generally note 12 supra. The courts usually have held that an unsuccessful
bidder for a government contract has standing to challenge the procedure whereby the con-
tract was awarded. See William F. Wilke, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 485 F.2d 180, 183
(4th Cir. 1973); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver, 433 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Ballarina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204, 1206-09 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Ellsworth
Bottling Co. v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 280, 282-83 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Keco Indus., Inc.
v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 1361, 1363 (D.D.C. 1970).
0 564 F.2d at 1123. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); see also Port of
Boston Marine Terminal Assoc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970);
ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 383 U.S. 576, 602 (1966); Frozen Food Express v. United
States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (1939);
Brooks v. Clifford, 412 F.2d 1127, 1138 (4th Cir. 1969).
11 See Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362, 368-70 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Weinberger,
483 F.2d 410, 416-17 (1st Cir. 1973).
-" Cf. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 507 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1975) (the
agency, not court, is to determine in first instance the coverage of regulatory statute in
preliminary investigation of possible violations); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 496 F.2d
197, 200 (5th Cir. 1974) (the agency's interpretation of statute entitled to "great deference");
Brannon v. Stark, 185 F.2d 871, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1950),. aff'd, 342 U.S. 451 (1952) (agency
construction of statute is entitled to great weight, but agency may not decide limits of its
statutory power).
1 564 F.2d at 1124-25. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)
(controversy is ripe for review where matter in question cannot be resolved by subsequent
agency action, or where agency has clearly circumvented administrative due process).
1 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1976); see K. DAvis, AD misTRA= LAw oF m. S.VENTM, §
3A.7 (1976 & Supp. 1978). Davis explains that the APA does not distinguish clearly between
the meaning of "statements of general policy- or interpretations" and "interpretations whici
19791
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are generally issued in the form of regulations. The regulations are pub-
lished in the Federal Register "for the guidance of the public."'2 Publication
in the Federal Register is required in order to protect a citizen from being
affected adversely by regulations of which he has no knowledge.3 Informa-
tion which either creates or delimits methods of determining the scope of
substantive rights and liabilities constitutes a form of law which cannot
be withheld from the public.4 In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,5 the
information contained in a Development Document,6 pertaining to cooling
water intake structures and effluent limitations, was not reported in the
Federal Register by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).7 Instead,
the EPA intended that germane portions of the Development Document
be incorporated by reference into the Code of Federal Regulations.8 The
Fourth Circuit held that the EPA had failed to comply with the publica-
tion requirements necessary to incorporate documents by reference, and
indicated that it would strictly enforce APA publication provisions.' Thus,
effluent limitation standards issued pursuant to section 316(b) of the Fed-
have been adopted by the agency." The "statements" must be published in the Federal
Register, pursuant to section 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1976), whereas the "interpretations"
need be only generally available to the public, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976). Davis
concludes that no authoritative answer can be given to the simple question of whether an
agency's interpretive rules must be published. Id.; see generally Warren, The Notice Require-
ment in Administrative Rulemaking: An Analysis of Legislative and Interpretive Rules, 29
AD. L. Rsv. 367 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Warren].
1 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976).
3 Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 410 (9th Cir. 1954). See generally T.S.C.
Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 777, 786 (S.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd sub
nom. Herrin Transp. Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 419 (1961); Pinkus v. Reilly, 157 F. Supp.
548, 551 (D.N.J. 1957).
1 See Cuneo v. Schlesipger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 n.13, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See
generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 823-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977
(1974); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Hayes, 325
F.2d 307, 309 (4th Cir. 1963); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 658-60 (D.N.M. 1976);
see also Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169-72 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Ethly Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d
47, 48-51 (4th Cir. 1973); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071-73 (D.C. Cir. 1971); B&C Tire
Co. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Petkas v. Staats, 364 F. Supp. 680, 682-
84 (D. D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 501 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977).
The EPA implemented 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1976), pertaining to cooling water intake
structures and effluent emissions, by issuing regulations which provided that in determining
the best available technology for the intake structures, "[tihe information contained in the
Development Document shall be considered." 40 C.F.R. §§ 402.10-.12 (1977). Information in
the Development Document was intended by the EPA to provide general guidance in the
issuing of discharge permits on a case-by-case basis. 566 F.2d at 454 n.4.
Id. at 455.
Id.; see EPA Effluent Guidelines and Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 402 (1977).
566 F.2d at 457. The Fourth Circuit also held that regulations implementing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b) (1976) are not restricted to steam-electric generating plants, but include steel mills.
Id. at 457-58. Furthermore, the court refused to review the merits of the regulations because
any ruling at that point in time would have constituted an advisory opinion. Id. at 458-59.
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eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 were unenforce-
able. 10
The EPA stressed that an unpublished regulation may be nonetheless
effective against persons with actual and timely notice of its terms." Spe-
cifically, the EPA noted the availability of the document and the petition-
ers' cognizance of its existence.' 2 The Fourth Circuit, however, emphasized
that the APA distinguishes between actual notice of the pertinent date and
the reasonable availability of the document containing the data.' 3 Actual
notice satisfies the APA publication provision and an unpublished regula-
tion is binding upon parties who are aware of both its specific contents and
its applicability to them." However, an unpublished regulation which is
merely reasonably available to the parties is not binding due to a failure
to satisfy publication requirements. 5
The Fourth Circuit emphasized that nothing in the EPA's brief sug-
gested that the petitioner had actual notice of thfe information contained
in the Development Document." Furthermore, the EPA did not explain
what it intended the term "information" to encompass, and the Develop-
ment Document referred to over fifty other documents, including some not
currently available.' 7 Notice requirements are not satisfied where unpub-
lished procedures are imprecisely delineated, if at all, to the affected par-
ties." Even when actual notice is conveyed to interested parties, the notice
' Id. at 457; see 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1976). For a discussion of statutory construction
problems in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, see Parenteau & Tauman, The Effluent
Limitations Controversy: Will Careless Draftsmanship Foil the Objectives of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972?, 6 Eco. L.Q. 1 (1977); Comment, The
Application of Effluent Limitations and Effluent Guidelines to Industrial Pollutors: An Ad-
ministrative Nightmare, 13 Hous. L. Rav. 348 (1976); Note, Judicial Maelstrom in Federal
Waters: A Composite Interpretation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, 45 FORDHAM L. Rav. 625 (1976).
11 566 F.2d at 456. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976) states that persons possessing "actual and
timely notice of the terms" of unpublished regulations are required to comply with those
provisions. United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341,348 (2d Cir. 1962) (unpublished coast guard
order restricting harbor access during submarine launchings binding on defendants who were
aware of its promulgation); c.f. Rodriguez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 295 (N.D. Ill. 1970),
aff'd mem., 403 U.S. 901 (1971) (unpublished aid benefit regulations binding upon parties
with actual notice of their contents); Timber Access Indus. Co. v. United States, No. 180-75
(Ct. Cl. April 20, 1977) (rate predeterminations not published in the Timber Regulations or
the Federal Register binding upon parties with actual notice).
12 566 F.2d at 456.
11 Id. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1), (a)(2); see also Warren, supra note 1, at 367.
" 566 F.2d at 456. See generally note 11 supra.
15 566 F.2d at 456; see Timber Access Indus. Co. v. United States', No. 180-75 (Ct. Cl.
April 20, 1977) (noting that ordinarily a rule cannot bind or adversely affect a person absent
publication).
11 566 F.2d at 456. The electric utilities did not contend that they were unaware of the
Development Document's existence, only that they were without knowledge of the specific
sections of the document which the EPA viewed as incorporated by reference into the 33
U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1976) regulations. Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellants at 8. See generally
text accompanying notes 17-20 & 24-27 infra.
'7 566 F.2d at 457.
, Id. at 456-57; cf. City of Santa Clara, Cal. v. Kleppe, 418 F. Supp. 1243, 1258-59 (N.D.
1979]
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requirement is not discharged if the procedures to be followed are incom-
plete or inexact.19 Instead, a reasonably exhaustive code of procedures is
contemplated which will serve as an adequate guideline for interested
parties."
Where no actual notice has been conveyed to the parties and where the
pertinent information has not been published, unpublished regulations
still may bind affected persons if the regulations are incorporated by refer-
ence into the Federal Register.2' A valid incorporation by reference must
be approved by the Director of the Federal Register.2 The Fourth Circuit
in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train stressed that the EPA's failure to
procure the director's approval could not be disregarded.? Furthermore,
the EPA did not satisfy regulations of the Office of the Federal Register
which dictate that language incorporating material by reference be precise
and complete. 4 Each incorporation by reference must include an identifi-
cation and brief subject description of the matter incorporated.? In the
instant controversy, provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations pertain-
ing to structures used to withdraw water for cooling and effluent limitation
standards did not delineate which portions of the two hundred seventy-
three page Development Document constituted relevant information to be
regarded by those requesting and issuing discharge permits. 6 Moreover,
the document was incomplete insofar as it referred to other documents,
some of which were unavailable to the public.? Thus, the court held that
the language of the incorporation was neither precise nor complete, and
therefore invalid.?
Having failed to satisfy the provisions for incorporation by reference,
Cal. 1976) ("frequent contacts" between the Bureau of Reclamation and its customers held
an insufficient justification for failure to publish power allocation procedures); Northern Cal.
Power Agency v. Morton, 396 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 243 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (where the Bureau of Reclamation failed to publish descriptions of the rate-making
procedures and the procedures outlined informally were "incomplete, imprecise, and inaccur-
ate," the rate increases promulgated pursuant to unpublished procedures were invalid).
" 566 F.2d at 456; cf. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (infor-
mation which is in effect substantive law must not be concealed beneath a mass of extraneous
material).
" 566 F.2d at 456-57. No administrative course of action instituted pursuant to unpub-
lished procedures can be permitted to stand against persons adversely affected thereby.
Northern Cal. Power Agency v. Morton, 396 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.D.C. 1975). See also
Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); W. G. Cosby Transfer & Storage
Corp. v. Froehlke, 480 F.2d 498, 501-02 (4th Cir. 1973).
21 Office of the Federal Register, Incorporation by Reference, 1 C.F.R. § 51 (1978).
22 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976); see 1 C.F.R. § 51.4 (1978). See also 566 F.2d at 455.
566 F.2d at 455.
24 1 C.F.R. § 51.6 (1978).
- Id. § 51.7.
" 566 F.2d at 457. 40 C.F.R. § 402.12 (1977) provides in part: "Itihe information con-
tained in the Development Document shall be considered in determining whether the loca-
tion, design, construction and capacity of a cooling water intake structure of a point source
. . . reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact."
566 F.2d at 457.
"Id.
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